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In Re: Parental Rights as to T.M.R., 137 Nev. Adv. Op. 23 (May 27, 2021)1 
 
NRCP 16.2(e)(4)’s MANDATE REGARDING DISCLOSURE OF NONEXPERT 
WITNESSES APPLIES TO TERMNATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS PROCEEDINGS 
 
Summary  
The Court considered whether the nonexpert witness notice requirements in NRCP 16.2 
apply to termination of parental rights proceedings. The Court held that NRCP 16.2(e)(4)’s 
mandate regarding disclosure of nonexpert witnesses did apply to termination of parental rights 
proceedings. The Court concluded that while the district court’s failure to apply the NRCP 
16.2(e)(4)’s mandate regarding disclosure of witness was error, the error was harmless in this 




Appellant Marcus H. and Dana B. are respondent T.M.R.’s birth parents. While T.M.R. 
was an infant, both of his birth parents lived with Dana’s 100-year-old-grandmother, Gladys S. 
During a fight between Marcus and Dana, Marcus hit Gladys in the face and damaged her home. 
Charges were filed, and Marcus ultimately pleaded guilty to felony coercion and was sentenced to 
a minimum of 24 months and maximum of 60 months in prison.  
 Meanwhile, Dana was arrested for driving under the influence, while texting on a cell 
phone, without a driver’s license, and with T.M.R. improperly restrained in the vehicle. Because 
both parents were incarcerated, the Department of Family Services (DFS) placed T.M.R. into 
protective custody and later placed him with a foster family.  
 DFS petitioned to terminate Marcus’s and Dana’s parental rights and a trial commenced.2 
Marcus’s DFS caseworker testified that Marcus had not made timely progress on the case plan that 
the DFS caseworker had created to address Marcus’s violent behavior and substance abuse. 
Instead, during the time that Marcus was out of custody, he tested positive for one drug and refused 
to submit to multiple other drug tests, all while minimizing his bad behavior. T.M.R.’s foster 
mother testified that T.M.R.’s aggressive behavior had greatly improved with time and therapy 
and that he had bonded with his foster family. The foster family expressed their desire to adopt 
T.M.R.  
 After the first day of trial, the State filed a notice naming Gladys as a witness. Marcus filed 
a motion in limine to exclude Gladys’s testimony on the grounds that she was not timely disclosed 
pursuant to NRCP 16.2. The district court denied Marcus’s motion, concluding NRCP 16.2’s 
nonexpert witness disclosure requirements do not apply to termination of parental rights 
proceedings. Thereafter, Gladys testified about the altercation with Marcus, with the district court 
terminating Marcus’s parental rights at the conclusion of trial. The court concluded that the 
termination of parental rights was in T.M.R.’s best interest and that parental fault for this decision 
existed.  
Marcus appealed, arguing that the district court erred by denying his motion in limine to 
exclude Gladys’s testimony and that the court’s decision to terminate his parental rights was not 
supported by substantial evidence.  
 
1  By Luis Montañez.  
2  Although the trial involved termination of both Marcus’ and Dana’s parental rights, this opinion addresses only 
the proceedings regarding Marcus.  
Discussion  
 Termination of parental rights proceedings are government by the Nevada Rules of Civil 
Procedure. But the rules fail to clearly amount for disclosure requirements in such proceedings, 
making it unclear which rule applies to termination of parental rights. To resolve this ambiguity, 
the Court read these rules “in pari materia.” Rules “in pari materia” involve “‘the same classes of 
persons or things or seek to accomplish the same purpose or object.’”3 To interpret the Rules “in 
pari materia,” NRCP 16.1, 16.2, and 16.205 “‘must be read and construed together, and so 
harmonized as to give effect to [each of] them…’”4 
 The Court noted that “the unmistakable thrust of the three rules, read together, is to broadly 
cover the gamut of civil proceedings,” concluding that NRCP 16.2(e)(4)’s witness disclose 
requirement must apply to the termination of parental rights proceedings to the extent practicable 
when read “in pari materia.”5 
 Additionally, the Court noted that construing Rules 16.1, 16.2, 16.205 separately and in a 
“vacuum and concluding that no part of any of those rules applies to termination of parental rights 
trials would lead to an absurd result”—that of enabling the State to ambush a parent during trial 
with a surprise witness.6 This would be contrary to established caselaw which notes that statutory 
construction should always avoid an absurd result and that the purpose behind the statutory scheme 
created by the Nevada Legislature is to assure that parental rights are not erroneously terminated 
and that the child’s needs are protected.  
 Because the State failed to notice Gladys as a witness for trial and because the termination 
of parental rights is the equivalent to a civil death penalty, the Court held that the district court 
abused its discretion by failing to exclude Glady’s testimony pursuant to NRCP 16.2.  
 Nevertheless, the Court affirmed the district court’s decision to terminate Marcus’s 
parental rights because substantial evidence supported the district court’s termination of Marcus’s 
parental rights despite the admission of Gladys’s unnoticed testimony. The Court noted that 
Marcus failed to rebut the presumption that termination of his parental rights was in T.M.R.’s best 
interest and that the record supports the district court’s parental fault findings.  
 
Conclusion  
 The Court affirmed the district court’s order terminating Marcus’s parental rights because 
substantial evidence supported such decision, even without Gladys’s testimony. However, the 
Court noted that the district court erred by denying Marcus’s motion in limine to exclude an 
unnoticed nonexpert witness during trial. When read “in pari materia” with Rule 16.1 and 16.205, 
Rule 16.2’s nonexpert witness disclosure requirements apply to termination of parental rights 
cases. This interpretation also avoids construing the statutory scheme in a way that would 
precipitate an absurd result and assures that parental rights are not erroneously terminated and that 
the child’s needs are protected.  
 
3  State, Div. of Ins.v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 116 Nev. 290, 294, 995 P.2d 482, 485 (2000) (interpreting 
NEV. REV. STAT. 687B.285).  
4  Presson v. Presson, 38 Nev. 203, 208, 147 P. 1081, 1082 (1915).  
5  In the Matter of T.M.R., 487 P.3d 783, 788 (Nev. 2021).  
6  Id.  
